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Management accounting information and the board 
meeting of an English Further Education college   
 
Purpose This paper aims to investigate the intersection between corporate 
governance and management accounting information within the board meeting of an 
English Further Education college. 
Design/methodology/approach The empirical fieldwork uses an interventionist 
approach. Board members’ mental models of a management accounting boundary 
object are analysed. 
Findings The paper supports Parker (2007) and Cornforth & Edward’s (1999) 
observation that, within a board meeting, collaborative ‘micro-management’ type talk 
is considered to lie outside of the acceptable remit of non-executive and executive 
board member interaction. Such an attitude can prevent an intertwining of 
management accounting information and other mental models of an organisation 
occurring. This can preclude management accounting information from rendering an 
organisation visible, in an expansive manner, within a boardroom. 
Research limitations/implications Interventionist researchers working within the 
black box of the board are encouraged to design more radical and collaborative 
interventions than the interview/report format used here. 
Practical implications Non-executive directors might benefit from being offered the 
opportunity to interact with management accounting information outside of the formal 
board meeting and committee structure.  
Originality/value A deeper understanding of how directors’ mental models, 
boardroom behaviours, and attitudes influence their interaction with management 
accounting information is offered. Insight into the limitations of using management 
accounting information in the boardroom is developed. 
 
Key words Corporate governance, Management accounting, Visibility, Boundary 
object, Mental model, Board meeting, Interventionist research 
 
Paper type Research paper 
  
1. Introduction 
“The intersection of…corporate governance…and management accounting 
[information] has been given little interest from researchers” Johanson (2008, p.371). 
This is because the accounting community has tended to study how externally 
published financial accounting information is implicated in corporate governance, 
rather than management accounting information (Johanson, 2008). Moreover, the 
extant literature that considers this intersection (eg. Hough et al., 2015; Michaud, 
2014; Manochin et al., 2011; Johanson, 2008; Parker 2008, 2003) has not 
“penetrate[d] [fully to] the very heart of director thinking and behaviour” (Parker, 
2008, pp. 86). As such, the aim of this paper is to investigate how board members, of 
an English Further Education College understand and use management accounting 
information - within the specific context of the board meeting.  
Corporate governance is a situated (McNulty et al., 2013) and socialized (Parker and 
Hoque, 2015) activity. At its heart lies the board, comprised of executive and non-
executive directors, who are responsible jointly for the governance of the 
organisation (Cornforth, 2012). At board meetings (Machold and Farquhar, 2013; 
Samra‐Fredericks, 2000) directors seek to collaborate with each other through 
discussion (Bailey and Peck, 2013; Forbes and Milliken, 1999) and, where 
appropriate, non-executive directors monitor and control the actions of executive 
directors (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003).  Effective governance requires a skilful 
switching between control and collaboration within a board meeting (Nicholson et al. 
2017; Roberts et al., 2005) because an over-emphasis on control and monitoring can 
have a negative impact on board effectiveness (Brennan et al., 2016). This article 
frames board activity using a control and collaboration perspective recognising that 
boards engage in other processes and behaviours such as strategizing (Pugliese et 
al., 2009); boundary spanning (Miller-Millesen, 2003); and resourcing the 
organization (Parker, 2003). 
Non-executive directors are not involved in the day to day running of the organisation 
and the literature holds that non-executives will have a more limited visibility of 
certain aspects of the organisation than the executives (Brennan et al., 2016). 
Roberts et al. (2005) note that this difference in visibility impacts both the 
collaborative and control aspects of governance, highlighting that there is a 
mundane, yet crucial, driver of effective governance within a board. This is the non-
executives’ “knowledge of the [organisation]” (pp. S19). This is because “[within a 
board] executive perceptions of the relevance and value of non-executive 
interventions, and indeed non-executives’ confidence in intervening, depend upon 
[the non-executives’] …. knowledge and understanding of the [organisation]” (pp. 
S19). If knowledge and understanding of an organisation is synonymous with the 
metaphor of visibility, the question then arises: how can non-executives develop an 
appropriate visibility of the organisation that they govern?  
 
Management accounting information provides a possible solution to this visibility 
problem. As a powerful social technology management accounting can render an 
organisation visible (Sikka, 2013; Johanson, 2008), even to those who might be 
distanced from its operating activities (Abrahamsson et al., 2016) - for example non-
executive board members. Hopwood (1987, pp. 225) asserts that it can “render 
visible in a quite particular manner the functioning of the operational core of [an] 
organisation”. Yet even though management accounting information has the 
potential to “render aspects of organisations visible and hence governable” (Paisey 
and Paisey, 2011, pp. 91), it does not follow immediately that the presentation of 
management accounting information to a board will automatically provide an 
effective visibility of the organisation. Three possible reasons for this are noted 
below. 
Firstly, the relevant literature contains examples of management accounting 
information being presented to a board but being discussed minimally, or having little 
connection with general board discussion (eg. Hough et al. 2015, Johanson, 2008; 
Collier, 2005). Secondly, board members’ visibility of an organisation does not come 
entirely from the presentation of formal management accounting reports (Brennan et 
al. 2016; Parker and Hoque 2015). Visibility develops though a variety of board level 
learning processes, including informal discussion inside (Parker, 2008) and outside 
(Brennan et al., 2016) the board meeting. Finally, management accounting research 
has argued that it is only when understandings of management accounting numbers 
and calculations are intertwined with operational understandings that management 
accounting information can make aspects of the organisation visible in a meaningful 
manner (Abrahamsson et al., 2016; Laine et al., 2016). This final theoretical 
argument arises from qualitative research conducted at an operational level, but has 
not been applied to board level research. 
As such, this article presents and discusses a board level research project that was 
conducted at a large English Further Education College (Hill et al., 2016; Masunga; 
2013). An interventionist approach is used (Suomola et al., 2014; Sunding and 
Odenrick, 2010). The intervention conceptualises a specific management accounting 
report that was being designed for presentation to the board as a boundary object 
(Carlile, 2002). To explore board members’ visibility of the organisation the notion of 
a mental model is deployed (Englund and Gerdin, 2015; Hall 2011).  
The article is framed around the following research questions: 
RQ1. What visibility do board members expect management accounting 
information to give in a board meeting? 
RQ2. Why was there resistance to framing board meeting discussion around 
management accounting information?  
By exploring these questions, this article is able to discuss a practical, yet 
theoretically derived, implication of its findings. This concerns the use of 
management accounting boundary objects at a board level. 
The paper supports Parker (2007) and Cornforth & Edward’s (1999) observation 
that, within a board meeting, collaborative ‘micro-management’ type talk is 
considered to lie outside of the acceptable remit of non-executive and executive 
board member interaction. This attitude can prevent non-executives from “tack[ing] 
back-and-forth” (Abrahamsson et al., 2016, pp. 162; Star, 2010, pp. 605) between 
summary management accounting information and operational understandings, 
within a board meeting. Most particularly, it can preclude an intertwining of 
management accounting information and other mental models of the organisation 
occurring within a boardroom.  
A deeper understanding of boards where directors are reluctant to discuss 
management accounting information within the board meeting is offered. For the 
board studied, management accounting information primarily made executive control 
visible to non-executives. It did not provide the holistic understanding of the 
organisation that board members preferred to frame board discussion around. These 
contributions explain why management accounting information might not always 
render an organisation visible, in an expansive manner, within a board meeting. 
They also expose potential limitations of using management accounting information 
in the boardroom.  
The paper is structured as follows. A theoretical framing and literature review is 
offered in section 2. Then, in the next section, the research approach is explained 
and the case organisation introduced. The research findings are presented and 
discussed in section 4. This allows the original research questions to be answered in 
section 5. The key implications of these findings are then discussed before a 
conclusion is offered.  
 
2. Theoretical framing and literature review 
 
A theoretical framing and literature review is now presented. Firstly, the notion of a 
mental model is introduced. This provides a theoretical foundation to investigate how 
management accounting information can make an organisation visible to board 
members. Then, the literature pertaining to the intersection of corporate governance 
and management accounting information is reviewed. The review highlights how 
board meeting discussion and board level learning processes can influence the 
visibility of an organisation that board members have. Finally, management 
accounting information is framed as a boundary object.  
 
2.1 Mental models and visibility  
 
Learning (Brennan et al., 2016; Roberts at al., 2005) and sensemaking processes 
(Chandler, 2002) can provide partial and fallible visibilities of reality (Elder-Vas, 
2012). Subjective visibilities (Bhaskar,1998a) can lead to understandings being 
formed, and deeper understandings can, in turn, lead to richer visibilities being 
obtained (Bhaskar,1998b). When a subjective understanding becomes fairly stable 
over time, this thought pattern can be conceptualised as a mental model (Hall, 
2011). A mental model is a theoretical construct that captures a fallible and partial 
representation of the internalised, sign driven, sensemaking occurring within a 
knower (Englund and Gerdin, 2015; Chandler, 2002; de Haas and Algera, 2002). 
Mental models are neither the reality known, or the understanding of that reality. 
They are simply a conceptual tool that facilitates a discussion of the complicated 
connection between knowing and that which is known (eg. Elder-Vass, 2012; Ahrens 
and Khalifa, 2013). Thus, by studying mental models, as located within learning and 
sensemaking processes, it is possible to study visibilities of an organisation. 
Mental models can be confirmed or built (Hall, 2011), general or context specific 
(Englund and Gerdin, 2015). They can be used to: reason qualitatively about 
situations; reason about relationships within systems; and estimate approximate 
magnitudes. However, they are often incomplete in technical terms (Hall, 2011). At a 
board level, Miller (2002) and Parker (2007) have both noted that non-executives 
can fall back onto relying upon mental models that they have used in other 
organisations, that might not be fully appropriate to the specific organisation they are 
governing. Even though mental models are unique to an individual, several 
individuals do not need identical mental models to create a shared understanding. A 
board can arrive at a shared understanding when individuals have compatible mental 
models (Bailey and Peck, 2013).  
 
The focus of this paper is mental models that are connected with management 
accounting information. Research suggests that people can have technical mental 
models of management accounting ideas and data, but that these technical mental 
models might not necessarily be linked strongly to operational reality (Wouters and 
Wilderom, 2008). Additionally, people can have effective mental models of 
operational activities that are not linked strongly to technical mental models of 
management accounting information (Otley and Fakiolas, 2000). Abrahamsson et al. 
(2016) argue that it is only when mental models of management accounting 
information are intertwined with mental models of operational activities that 
management accounting information is able to render an organisation cogently 
visible. This notion of the intertwining of mental models is central to the argument 
made in this paper.  
 
The question then arises: how can mental models of management accounting 
information become intertwined with mental models of operational activities, and 
hence create an expansive visibility of an organisation? The management 
accounting literature suggests an answer that has been observed to hold at the 
operational level. Intertwining occurs when management accounting information 
becomes implicated in day-to-day, collaborative, problem solving talk (Abrahamsson 
et al., 2016; Hall, 2011). For example, mental models of operational knowledge can 
be used to imbue management accounting data with meaning through problem 
solving talk (Abrahamsson et al., 2016). Such intertwining can occur when managers 
need to make sense of management accounting information. Abrahamsson et al. 
(2016) offer a second example of intertwining. Mental models of management 
accounting information can be used to explore; confirm; reject; and even change 
mental models of operational knowledge. If these management accounting led 
processes occur, they can intertwine models of management accounting with models 
of the operational. In both of these examples the implications are the same: effective 
intertwining can lead to enhanced organisational visibility.  
 
This intertwining of mental models of management accounting information and 
operational activities has been identified as occurring at an operational level. 
However, the intertwining of mental models has not been studied at a board level. 
What has been studied is how management accounting information is used at a 
board level. This literature is now considered.  
 
2.2 The intersection of corporate governance and management accounting 
information 
The intersection of the corporate governance and management accounting 
information literature is summarised in Appendix 1. Some papers claim that 
management accounting information enjoys significant use within the board meeting 
itself (Michaud, 2014; Manochin et al., 2011; Johanson 2008; Parker 2008, 2003). 
Others observe the importance of management accounting information within board 
level processes, but not necessarily the board meeting itself (Saj, 2011; Ratnatunga 
and Alam, 2011; Roy, 2011). However, Hough et al. (2015) and Collier (2005) 
highlight the relative unimportance of management accounting information within the 
board meeting. Noting the disparity in these empirical results, two board level 
activities that are common to all boards are now discussed. These are board 
meeting discussion and non-executive learning processes.  
Board meeting discussion takes place within a dynamic of control and collaboration. 
Control can occur when non-executive directors use management accounting 
information to monitor the actions of executive directors (Michaud, 2014; Saj, 2013; 
Johanson, 2008). Collaboration can arise when management accounting information 
is used to inform strategic discussion between the executives and non-executives 
(Michaud, 2014; Bailey and Peck, 2013, Ratnatunga and Alam, 2011; Johanson, 
2008). Some writers frame control and collaboration as two distinct activities that 
need to be balanced (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003) whilst others appear to see 
them as existing together within a common accountability continuum (Brennan et al., 
2016; Roberts et al. 2005). It is important to note that the collaborative strategic 
discussion enacted within a board meeting is different to the collaborative problem 
solving that occurs at the operational level and outside of the board meeting. 
Moreover, within the board meeting itself, collaborative ‘micro-management’ type talk 
is considered to lie outside of the acceptable remit of non-executive and executive 
board member interaction (Parker, 2007; Cornforth & Edwards, 1999). 
The learning processes of non-executive board members (Brennan et al., 2016) that 
can lead to understanding are now considered. Brennan et al. (2016), building upon 
Nonaka (1994; and Konno, 1998) argue that non-executive learning occurs both 
inside and outside of the boardroom via formal and informal processes. An example 
of a learning process is the presentation and accompanying discussion of 
management accounting information within a board meeting (Roy, 2011; Johanson, 
2008). But learning, and hence enhanced visibility, does not occur simply through 
the formal presentation and discussion of reports at a board meeting (Parker and 
Hoque, 2015). Spontaneous questioning by the non-executives, that arises from ad 
hoc comments made by the executives, can create learning within a board meeting 
too (Parker, 2003). Moreover, there are many informal learning processes that can 
occur outside of the boardroom, for example: chats between non-executives and 
executives; site visits made by the non-executives; and collaborative board away 
days (Brennan et al., 2016). 
 
This article assumes that non-executives need a strong understanding of the 
organisation that they govern (Roy, 2011; Thomas et al., 2009; Johanson, 2008, 
Roberts et al., 2005; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003; cf. Brennan et al., 2016) so 
that they are able to gain the respect of the executives and govern effectively 
(Roberts et al., 2005). Without this understanding effective collaboration between 
non-executives and executives can become increasingly difficult (Baysinger and 
Hoskisson, 1990). However, studies indicate that non-executives sometimes do not 
understand the organisations that they govern (Bailey and Peck, 2013; Johanson, 
2008; Rutherford et al., 2007; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). Therefore, this paper 
considers how understandings of management accounting information are implicated 
in corporate governance - with specific attention being given to the use of 
management accounting information within the board meeting.  
 
To close this aspect of the review, the corporate governance literature pertaining to 
English Further Education Colleges is now discussed. Several studies have found 
that non-executive board members of colleges realise that ensuring the financial 
sustainability of these non-profit (Sala, 2003) institutions is a key governance task 
(Hill et al., 2016; Masunga; 2013). However, Gleeson (et al., 2011; and Shain, 1999) 
highlight that a focus upon the control of finance is not always considered to be good 
governance practice and that boards should give greater attention to the core 
business of teaching than to financial control. The complicated and non-business like 
funding regime that colleges operate within can make even the control of finance a 
challenging and sometimes bewildering task, especially for board members from a 
business background (Hill and James, 2017; Hill et al. 2016). Yet this business 
background of many college non-executives has been observed to lead to positive 
governance interventions (Cornforth and Edwards, 1999). Finally, and in harmony 
with the general corporate governance literature, Hill and James (2017) report that a 
chair’s responsibilities include ensuring that executives and senior managers present 
appropriate information at board meetings.  
2.3 Management accounting as a boundary object 
 
Finally, a theoretical framing of management accounting information is offered. This 
provides a platform to study the intersection of corporate governance and 
management accounting information.  
Management accounting information can be conceptualised as a boundary object 
(Laine et al., 2016; Star, 2010, Carlile, 2002). A boundary object is a means of 
managing visibilities and understandings at a given boundary (Carlile, 2002). Within 
the board meeting, management accounting information is located on the boundary 
between the executives and the non-executives. This is because the executives 
prepare the information for presentation to, and discussion with, the non-executives 
(Brennan et al., 2016). Moreover, within the dynamics of the board meeting, such 
information also lies on the boundary between the board meeting itself and the 
operational reality of the organisation. This operational reality exists outside of the 
board meeting (Elder-Vass, 2012; Fleetwood, 2005; Collier, 1994) but needs to be 
visible, if only in part, to enable directors to govern effectively from the confines of 
the boardroom.  
Carlile (2002) highlights three key aspects of a boundary object. Firstly, an effective 
boundary object enables communication by establishing a shared language for 
individuals to represent knowledge (Carlile, 2002). Studies at both the board level 
(Michaud, 2014) and the operational level (Abrahamsson et al., 2016) have shown 
that management accounting boundary objects can facilitate management 
accounting talk amongst people from different backgrounds, to the extent that such 
accounting talk becomes a living language (Hall, 2010). Secondly, a productive 
boundary object can help individuals to learn about differences that exist across 
boundaries (Carlile, 2002). Thirdly, an enabling boundary object is embedded within 
collaborative processes that facilitate communication and learning. These 
collaborative processes can ultimately transform a person’s visibility of an 
organisation or issue (Carlile, 2002).   
There are many examples of management accounting boundary objects being 
located in processes that have enabled learning, and thus created visibilities of 
organisations or issues (Laine et al., 2016; Abrahamsson et al., 2016; Busco and 
Quattone, 2015; Englund and Gerdin, 2015; Wouters and Roijmans, 2011; Wouters 
and Wilderom; 2008; de Haas and Kleingeld, 1999). All of these examples, however, 
relate primarily to operational level studies. A contribution of this study is that it seeks 
to deploy the notion of a boundary object at a board level.   
A recurring theme of the operational level management accounting literature is that 
an enabling boundary object facilitates collaborative problem solving (Laine et al., 
2016; Chenhall, 2003).  Such successful problem solving can occur when: all users 
of a boundary object are free to experiment with its design and construction 
(Wouters and Roijmans, 2011); there is sufficient flexibility to allow for the 
interrogation and change of the boundary object (Abrahamsson et al., 2016); 
weaknesses can be easily repaired (Englund and Gerdin, 2015); and assumptions 
driving its construction are open to change due to innovative questioning and 
dialogue (de Haas and Kleingeld, 1999). This sense of flexibility, interrogation and 
change harmonises with the general boundary object literature. Star (2010) evokes 
the image of a continual “tack[ing] back-and-forth” (pp. 605) - towards the boundary 
object and then away from it - to summarise the enabling work processes that 
boundary objects can inspire. 
 
2.4 Summary 
To conclude: board members, including non-executives, need to have the 
organisation that they govern rendered visible in an effective way. When 
conceptualised as a boundary object, management accounting information, can help 
to provide such visibility. However, the operational level management accounting 
literature observes that mental models of management accounting information have 
to be intertwined with models of operational activities for an effective visibility to be 
realised. This topic is now explored at a board level using empirical data obtained 
from an interventionist research project conducted at an English Further Education 
College.  
 
3. Research approach and the case organisation 
 
3.1 Choice of the case organisation  
Successful board level governance research requires that the black box of the board 
room be penetrated (Parker and Hoque, 2015). For this paper, access into the board 
room was facilitated through the lead researcher’s position as chair of the Audit and 
Risk Committee of a large English Further Education college. As a board member, 
the lead researcher had often observed resistance, or ‘determined apathy’, towards 
interacting with management accounting information within the board meeting. A 
desire to better understand this pervasive observation motivated this research.  
 
3.2 Intervention opportunity and interventionist methodology  
An interventionist research approach was adopted. This is a type of action research 
that promotes engaged scholarship (Suomola et al., 2014; Sunding and Odenrick, 
2010; Jonsson and Lukka, 2007). "Many talk about it but few do it" (Westin and 
Roberts, 2010, p. 8). 
In this particular case, the intervention opportunity arose in the general rhythm of 
governance and was not created artificially. The chair requested that the executive 
devise, and present to the board, a one-page governance document that 
summarised key financial and other performance data upon it. The aim of this 
boundary object was to provide an ‘at a glance visibility’ of the organisation for non-
executives at each board meeting. The chair would later state “I call it learning to 
see.” The finance director led the executive in designing and preparing the boundary 
object. The initial design was also influenced by the chair, and several other non-
executives, who had voiced a desire to see the performance of the college split by 
department. When a draft boundary object (Appendix 2) was presented at a board 
meeting the response of the non-executives was muted and unenthusiastic. At this 
point the lead researcher approached the chair and CEO and offered to conduct an 
interventionist research project to better understand this feedback. This offer was 
accepted warmly.  
The intervention centred upon 19 semi-structured interviews with the entire executive 
team (7 interviews) and the majority of the non-executives (12 interviews). A 
summary description of the interviewees is set out at Appendix 3. The interviews 
were designed to expose relevant mental models. Most particularly, the interviews 
sought to uncover both shared and divergent understandings amongst board 
members. This is because it requires a delicate balance of both shared and 
divergent understandings to create an effective board (Bailey and Peck, 2013; 
Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). All the interviews, except the initial scoping 
interview with the CEO, were recorded and transcribed professionally. Appropriate 
consideration was given to the fact that some of the interviews were with elites 
(Odendahl and Shaw, 2001), for example the CEO and the chair. Careful attention 
was also paid to board members who might be construed as being marginalised, 
namely the staff and student board representatives (Modell, 2015). Additionally, a 
diary was kept logging key events and two operational meetings were attended. After 
an initial analysis of the interviews, a draft intervention report was discussed with the 
CEO and chair in a private meeting. A final report was then issued to the entire 
board and tabled as a discussion item at a main board meeting. 
During the intervention, the lead researcher avoided positioning himself as an expert 
consultant by explicitly approaching the intervention as an academic colleague 
seeking to understand the research issues. Also, as a board member and an 
academic researcher, the lead researcher was both an insider and an outsider with 
respect to the board. Accordingly, the co-author exerted a coaching influence on the 
lead researcher when handling both the emic (insider) and etic (outsider) aspects of 
their location in the research process (Jonsson and Lukka, 2007; Dumay, 2010). 
Moreover, the co-author had no contact with the college to aid the production of a 
critically reflexive account (Johnson and Duberley, 2003). At all times the research 
process was overseen by the researchers’ institutional ethics committee.  
 
3.3 Analysis and interpretation 
Analysis of the interview data occurred both before and after the intervention report 
was issued to the college. This analysis was conducted by grouping thematically 
extracts from the transcripts. At all times careful attention was given to the 
interpretation of these interview extracts (Ahrens and Khalifa, 2013). This was 
facilitated by adopting the following hermeneutical posture (Hartwig, 2007). Firstly, 
as discussed above, the researchers were acutely aware of their own location in the 
intervention process and how this might impact the interpretation and analysis of the 
interviews. Secondly, the theory laden assumptions of both the intervention and the 
analysis process, were laid open to critique on several occasions. Finally, the 
limitations and subjectivity of the responses of the interviewees was recognised. This 
last point follows Bhaskar's (1998, p. xvi) assertion that "actors accounts are both 
corrigible and limited by the existence of unacknowledged conditions, unintended 
consequences, tacit skills and unconscious motives". This hermeneutical posture led 
to the interview extracts being interpreted in the context of the entire intervention, 
and not just as isolated sections of narrative. 
 
3.4 The case study sector and organisation 
The organisation studied was an English Further Education (‘FE’) college. FE is an 
important sector in England, turning over more than £8 billion per annum and training 
approximately three million people each year (Hill et al., 2016). FE has a vocational 
focus and is located between statutory schooling and higher education. English FE 
colleges are funded primarily by the government, but display a significant autonomy 
in their approach to governance processes (AOC, 2015). Due to governmental 
austerity measures (BIS, 2015), the FE sector has faced significant cuts in funding 
since 2010. Table I gives a summary of the financial performance of the sector as a 




The case study organisation generated an operating loss in 2010/11, however, it 
returned small operating surpluses between 2012 and 2014. In 2013/14, when the 
intervention took place, the case study organisation reported an annual turnover of 
£54 million, employed about 1,000 members of staff and delivered training and 
education across 25 departments. 
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
Operating surplus/deficit of whole FE college sector (£ million) 169 142 13 (34)
Total number of colleges 254 250 245 244
Percentage of colleges in operating deficit 20% 25% 36% 45%
Extracted from BIS (2015)
Table I. The financial performance of the English FE sector
The college board comprised of an executive CEO and 13 non-executive members, 
who are termed governors in the FE sector. Six other executives were also included 
in the interventionist project as they attend, and take an active part in, all board 
meetings – even though they are not statutory directors. The board has three 
committees, where non-executives carry out detailed monitoring and scrutiny of the 
organisation. These committees transact their business outside of the main board 
meeting and report their findings back to the main board. One committee, entitled 
The Finance, Employment and General Purpose Committee, has a specific remit to 
scrutinise the financial control of the college. The research project considered the 
board meeting in particular, and did not investigate the committee structure.  
 
4. Findings and initial discussion  
Rather than tell the story of the intervention in chronological order, several aspects of 
the entire intervention will now be considered in turn.  
4.1 A visibility of executive control  
The interviews gave board members an opportunity to tack back-and-forth between 
the proposed boundary object, their visibilities and understandings of the college, 
and management accounting information in general. Particular focus was paid to the 
specific management accounting information displayed on the boundary object and 
how that information was presented. Interviewees were encouraged to suggest how 
the boundary object could be (re)designed to give the visibility of the organisation 
that they desired.  
Even though the intervention focussed upon the design of the boundary object, the 
overwhelming response to it was an underwhelming ‘so what!’ This was not due 
primarily to differences of opinion as to which measurements or indicators to use, the 
lack of trend information, or even how to present data visually on the boundary 
object. The muted response to the boundary object was expressed in terms of how it 
might be discussed within the board meeting. For example: 
Non-executive: I don't know what you [could] do with this information. "Alright, 
Exec Team, Leadership Team, sort out those inadequate departments." Yes, 
okay, that's what we're trying to do. You haven't told us anything we don't 
know.  
Executive: If you drill down and you find out that out of the 10 departments 
within that local college, 7 are doing really well, 2 are doing okay, middling, 
they're stunningly average, and 1 is disastrous, what’s governors’ role there? 
These quotes summarise explicitly a pervasive opinion. Non executives could use 
the boundary object to monitor if executives were in control of a specific department, 
but it was uncertain as to how discussing the boundary object within the board 
meeting could help non-executives obtain more than just a visibility of executive 
control. Analysis of the interview transcripts suggests that when management 
accounting data were used to refer to specific aspects of the college, non-executives 
tended to conceptualise them as decision switches, or control wires, within a 
management toolkit. Within the board meeting, non-executives could review the 
data, but only in a decision appraising manner such as: ‘was the switch activated 
correctly by the executive?’ or ‘was the control wire tensioned appropriately?’  
This notion of management accounting providing a visibility of executive control was 
expressed in a variety of ways, sometimes in an implicit manner. For example, when 
such data was presented at the main board, this non-executive wanted a convincing 
story to accompany the presentation: 
Non-executive: We should have access to the numbers, but more importantly 
we should have access to the story they tell. Now the good part is that if the 
execs have to write a story to explain what's going on, they have to look at the 
numbers and explain them to themselves [and to the non-executives], which 
they don't always do. 
Here the reference to executive directors having to “explain [the numbers] to 
themselves” is an indication of a non-executive desire to stimulate control via a 
board reporting process. A potential outcome of such a control process is greater 
organisational visibility for the non-executives. However, the management 
accounting reporting process is interpreted primarily (“the good part”) as a control 
tool and not as an immediate form of non-executive organisational visibility.   
Interviews were interpreted in the context of the intervention as a whole, as 
illustrated below. The non-executive chair, who was instrumental in requesting the 
boundary object, said: 
Chair: I tell you what I want. I get absolutely sick of reading massive long 
documents and big packs of [board papers] …. I end up going backwards and 
forwards to try and remember what [a] figure was…. We need to be [kept] 
abreast of, in a simple way, without going into all the details and without 
managing it as executives, we need an overview of what’s going on, and in a 
trend way. 
 
The word “overview” could be referring to some kind of visibility of the organisation 
itself, it could be referring to a non-executive visibility of executive control, or it could 
be referring to a combination of both. The primary meaning of “overview” is 
potentially ambiguous when the quote is looked at in isolation, but locating the quote 
within the intervention as a whole allows it to be interpreted. After all the interviews 
had been conducted, a draft report was written and presented to the chair and the 
CEO in a private meeting. During the meeting the lead researcher suggested that the 
chair consider introducing the boundary object to the board meeting in a 
collaborative, problem solving manner. This could be done by saying something like 
‘Let us not use this management accounting information within the board meeting to 
control executive actions – instead, let us use it to collaborate together, to enrich our 
visibility of the organisation.’ This suggestion was not welcomed, or acted upon by 
the chair. As such, the primary meaning of the phrase “we need to be [kept] 
abreast...of what’s going on” is surely the expression of the chair’s desire for a 
visibility of executive control of the organisation -  facilitated through management 
accounting information – and not a desire for a richer visibility of the organisation.  
 
The quote also makes a very important point about the kind of talk that the chair 
wanted at the board meeting. The chair did not want non-executives to “manage the 
[organisation] as executives.” The implication of this is that the chair did not want 
non-executives to engage in a style of talk within the board meeting that was seen as 
encroaching into the domain of the executives. This interpretation is supported by 
numerous observations of board meetings by the lead researcher, where non-
executives avoided talking with executives in an operational problem solving 
manner.  
  
4.2 Management accounting “dashboards” are a kind of chimera – for some board 
members 
During the intervention, the lead researcher was responsive to finding evidence of 
management accounting information being used to give an expansive visibility of 
organisational reality. However, the transcript data gives little evidence of this. 
Management accounting data was not championed as a powerful way of giving 
visibility of the organisation at the board meetings. For example:  
 
Non-executive X: I think at one level, dashboards are a kind of chimera ... the 
idea that you can actually have one that's going to be sufficiently broad in its 
coverage, and ‘helpful’ in how it exposes what's going on: that might just be 
an impossibility!  
Non-executive: I hate these dashboard things because I think unless you’re in 
a very simple business, it’s very difficult to choose the right indicators because 
we could have a different set of indicators for almost every department here, I 
think.  
 
These quotes communicate a strong apathy towards management accounting 
information. The hope that a carefully designed management accounting report 
might give a desirable and expansive visibility of the organisation is “a chimera.” A 
chimera is something that is considered illusory or impossible to achieve.  Moreover, 
these interviewees refer to the management accounting information as a 
“dashboard” even though this term was not used by the interviewer. This indicates 
that these board members primarily understood the boundary object as a series of 
measurements, or indicators. These non-executives did not think that it was likely 
that these measurements could be woven together, and intertwined with other 
understandings, to form a tapestry that gave an expansive visibility of the 
organisation. This result is not limited to a number of non-executives, some of the 
executive team expressed a similar apathy towards a “balanced score card type” of 
reporting, too. 
 
It would be wrong, however, to conclude that these excerpts demonstrate that board 
members thought that management accounting information should never be 
presented to the board. Non-executive X argues that “at one level dashboards are a 
kind of chimera”, but at another “level” asserted that:  
 
Non-executive X: "a refined, sophisticated, thoughtful treatment of data and 
discussion of data,….very, very rarely goes on."  
Here, this experienced non-executive, who believes that management accounting 
information might not be able to give an expansive visibility of the organisation, 
argues strongly for the presentation of data to the board. What matters most, though, 
is the refined and sophisticated discussion that the data is embedded within, and not 
the exact way that the data is presented. 
 
These quotes suggest cogently that some of the board members thought that the 
boundary object was a kind of chimera. It promised to make the organisation visible 
in a helpful way, but could not deliver on its promise. This finding is also supported 




4.3 The inability of management accounting information to bring productive change 
within the board meeting   
 
The boundary object split the organisation into 25 departments, presenting financial 
and non financial performance measurements, and indicators, in a spreadsheet 
format (Appendix 2). This departmental split was championed by the chair prior to 
the intervention and analysed the organisation in terms of each department’s income 
and contribution. Several non-executives, including the lead researcher, considered 
this departmental split to be the most appropriate way of presenting the management 
accounting information. However, after interviewing each member of the executive 
team it became apparent that whilst departmental data was utilised by executives in 
managing the organisation, this did not reflect the framing of strategic discussion by 
the executive team that occurred outside of the board meeting. This was clarified in 
the following exchange: 
Interviewer: [funding for students who are] 14 to 15 [years], 16-18, 19-plus,  
Full-Cost Recovery, and Higher Education.  Is that the way you speak in the 
Executive? 
Executive: Yes. We do most of our analytical work in those configurations 
because it is how the funding drives us.  
Interviewer: I am starting to get a picture in my head. I think that, at a higher 
level, the Executive team starts to think in these funding streams, but the day-
to-day performance management of the business [and the planning and 
budgeting process] seems to be based on departments and these contribution 
targets. Have I misunderstood that? 
Executive: … you are absolutely right! 
As Miller (2002) and Parker (2007) have noticed previously, certain financially literate 
non-executives assumed that a departmental analysis, that they were familiar with 
from their professional experience, was the most appropriate way of presenting the 
management accounting information. But the executive team did not configure "most 
of [their strategic] analytical work" in this manner. Instead, they discussed funding 
streams in their totality before choosing to allocate a proportion of funding to specific 
departments at the level of the budget. Key funding contracts operated at an 
organisational level, not a department level, making departmental allocations of 
income an arbitrary internal apportionment. None of the non-executives interviewed 
realised this subtlety. Even though this finding was reported to the entire board and 
triggered deep learning for the lead researcher, no appetite for re-configuring the 
boundary object by funding stream was generated by the intervention report.  
If management accounting information is capable of providing a helpful visibility of 
the organisation, at the level of the board meeting, it is possible that this finding 
would have led to a re-configuration of the boundary object. But it did not. This 
suggests that for this board, at this particular time, even the re-configuration of 
management accounting information in a manner that could have: 
 enhanced the visibility of key funding flowing into the organisation, and 
 better mirrored the way the executive framed strategic funding discussion 
within the executive team 
was considered to be unimportant at the level of the board meeting. 
The resistance to the boundary object was even greater than not wanting to re-
configure it. As explained previously, after analysis of the interviews, a draft 
intervention report was written and discussed with the CEO and chair in a private 
meeting. The insight given by the report was commended. A report was then issued 
to the entire board, feedback was obtained and a final report was tabled as a 
discussion item at a board meeting. Again, the report was praised by several other 
board members. The report was tabled but, due to urgent other business, it was not 
discussed at that board meeting. The lead researcher decided actively to wait and 
see what the board did next. Nothing happened. Or more precisely, no boundary 
object - or any variant of it - appeared at any board meetings whilst the CEO 
remained in post. Moreover, no board member requested that the intervention report 
be discussed in detail at a subsequent board meeting.  The intervention did not bring 
about immediate productive change within the board. It failed to find a way to re-
design the boundary object so that the board welcomed its use within the board 
meeting.  
 
These findings suggest that board members did not want to frame board level 
discussion around the boundary object. If board members had wanted to frame 
board level discussion around management accounting information, they could have 
used the intervention to champion this desire, but they did not.  
 
 
4.4 Mental models of the college as a whole 
 
We now return back to the beginning of the interview sequence for a final time.  
  
Interviewees were asked a general introductory question about how they thought 
about the college. A strong shared understanding was uncovered.  Interviewees saw 
the college as a collection of physical locations, full of people, giving students a new 
opportunity, serving parents and enhancing the regional economy. Driven by its 
purpose and located within a political landscape, they saw a complicated 
organisation on a journey.  It is important to highlight that when asked to explain how 
they thought about the college interviewees did not did not talk about the college as 
a combination of interconnected pieces of management accounting information. 
Instead interviewees used a descriptive narrative, or a holistic image, to express 
their understandings of the college.  
Moreover, unless asked specifically to interact with management accounting 
information by the interviewer, the transcripts contain very little evidence of 
interviewees using management accounting information to frame talk about the 
college in general discussion. A couple of executives did refer to the student 
demographic using pie chart type stratifications, and a non-executive asserted that 
"[the college] needs…to get a black positive number at the bottom right-hand 
corner….[and have] enough money to keep reinvesting…." Yet, even though the 
interviews were conducted in a way that facilitated interviewees championing the use 
of management accounting information and management accounting centred talk, a 
general apathy towards using management accounting to frame discussion about 
the entire college pervaded the interviews. 
 
If board members did not favour using mental models of management accounting 
information to frame talk about the organisation the question arises: how did board 
members think about the organisation when wanting to talk about it? Several 
unexpected and powerful exchanges occurred that uncovered the mental models 
that certain board members used. One executive used the following striking 
metaphor to explain how they thought about the college: 
 Executive: The college is like a human body, parts of it need an enzyme 
adding, [another] bit is not required, [other bits are] poorly and we need to 
support them. 
Another non-executive exposed some of their internal mental imagery through 
evocative language: 
Non-executive: I think of it more as in process terms. I never have been 
somebody that has detailed models for very much….. There are not many 
days when I don't think about [the] representation of how soft iron is 
magnetised. Unmagnetised iron has got [lots of little] zones: …. [within each 
zone]… the lines of magnetisation…[are] all in one direction, but the zones 
are all around them, and therefore, the iron is unmagnetised. If you stroke it 
with a magnet, what it's having the effect of is lining up the zones, so they're 
all pointing in the same direction. There aren't many days when I don't think of 
that as a way of thinking about - how you get stuff to happen in an 
organisational context is to try to cause what are often not quite properly 
aligned parts of the system to just align a bit better. 
What is striking here is that both metaphors depend upon a holistic image, a whole 
body and an entire magnetic bar. The “poorly…bits” of the body, and the “un 
magnetized…zones” of the metal bar, are part of the whole metaphor but the primary 
image is of the whole, and not of the parts. Such models of understanding are 
termed holistic mental models in this article. It is important to note that these mental 
models were exposed voluntarily by the interviewees. They were not asked explicitly 
to expose them. 
When interviewees avoided referring to the organisation using management 
accounting information this reluctance was probed gently. The following comment by 
an executive was triggered by an attempt by the researcher to explain the rationale 
for the research project: 
Executive:  When you describe people who are just numbers and indicators 
and all that kind of thing, I’m sitting here listening to that thinking, “No, that’s 
not going to get us where we need to be. What we need to be is this much 
more...” It is much more a Gestalt feel, isn't it, it’s about the whole is more 
than the sum of its parts…..it’s about understanding the complexity of where 
you are and not seeing it as being just about that one thing. That’s what I am 
and that’s how I think I can do things. 
 
The reference to a Gestalt expresses the interviewee's preferred conceptualisation of 
the organisation. Such a holistic mental model harmonises with previous quotes that 
favoured referring to the organisation as a whole, rather than as a series of carefully 
crafted management accounting measurements. It also unearths a link with the 
cognitive idea that humans internally favour referring to complexity as a meaningful 
whole rather than as a collection of disparate, but interconnected fragments 
(Woolfolk, 2010).   
 
4.5 Speed of understanding 
 
One final vignette from the interview process is now given. The aim of this is not to 
highlight the two directors concerned. Instead, the reportage is presented to suggest 
that a board members’ speed of understanding will affect the impact of management 
accounting information upon a board meeting.  
 
The chair said:  
“That’s the whole point of producing these sheets. We’re helping the 
governors…. You can’t be a governor if you can’t do the ... job. I’ll tell you 
now, [specific named] Governors will look at that and do exactly what I do [ie. 
spot areas of weakness and concern], straight away.” 
The chair proclaims that board members will be able to spot areas of concern 
highlighted by the management accounting information “straight away”. But one of 
the specific board members mentioned by the chair would later say: 
Non-executive: To be honest with you, I’m not massively numerical and if 
somebody plonks a spreadsheet in front of me, I need ten minutes to go away 
and look at it and tell me what it’s… You know that there are some people that 
can pick up a spreadsheet and then immediately they’re on to the key issues? 
I need ten minutes to go away and think, “Right, what’s this telling me?” and 
look at it and come back.  
I’ve got colleagues who can pick up a very big spreadsheet and very quickly 
tell you what’s going on in that company. I’m not in that camp. I want to meet 
the MD, I want to listen to him, I want to have a look around the [organisation], 
I want to see what’s going on, I want to listen to him.  
 
This vignette demonstrates that for some board members, time is needed to make 
sense of management accounting information. Whilst spotting areas of concern can 
be done quickly by certain board members, it can take other board members 
significant time to understand management accounting information. Moreover, for 
this non-executive, at least, they simply did not like interacting with management 
accounting information. They wanted to talk to people and to experience an 
organisation learn about it. They did not want to use a “very big spreadsheet” to gain 
a visibility of the organisation.  These ideas are developed in the discussion that 
follows. 
 
 5. Answering the research questions and further discussion  
The research questions posed at the beginning of the article will now be answered. 
The conclusions reached are based upon an analysis of the interviews, as located 
within the intervention as a whole. They are supported by the lead researcher’s 
observations, as a board member, of the board in action at board meetings. A 
limitation of this triangulation is that the board meeting observations were not 
analysed in a systematic manner.   
 
5.1 RQ1. What visibility do board members expect management accounting 
information to give in a board meeting? 
Within the board meeting, board members expected management accounting 
information to render executive control visible. It gave non-executives an opportunity 
to review the control that executives had of the organisation. The mental models that 
were formed as a result of a review of executive control acted as control wires or 
decision switches, connecting the executives with the organisation. Non-executives 
could ‘see’ if a control wire was in place (or not) and see if it was tensioned 
appropriately. But in the context of the discussion at the board meeting, little else 
was made visible. The hope that management accounting information might give an 
expansive, and desirable, visibility of the entire organisation was considered to be 
illusory: even a chimera. 
 
5.2 RQ2. Why was there resistance to framing board meeting discussion around 
management accounting information?  
There were several reasons why there was resistance to framing board meeting 
discussion around management accounting information. Firstly, as explained above, 
management accounting information was seen primarily as a control tool within the 
board meeting. Its role was to provide a visibility of executive control, it was not to 
frame general board level discussion.  
Secondly, the interviews uncovered evidence that supports the cognitive idea that, 
internally, humans favour referring to complexity as a meaningful whole rather than 
as a collection of disparate, but interconnected fragments (Woolfolk, 2010). The 
holistic mental models that board members expressed of the college as a whole did 
not have an immediate connection to the management accounting boundary object. 
The implication of this is that board members did not consider that the boundary 
object framed the college in a way that promoted general discussion about the 
college as whole. 
Thirdly, in a manner reminiscent of Parker (2007) and Cornforth and Edwards (1999) 
non-executives did not want to engage in operational type talk within the board 
meeting. Non-executives did not want to be seen to be “managing [the organisation] 
… as executives” within the board meeting. Management accounting information is 
designed primarily as a management tool. The intervention suggests that interacting 
with management accounting information within the board meeting, in any way other 
than to review executive control, is a possible encroachment into the domain of day 
to day management, and might not be socially appropriate within the board meeting.  
Fourthly, the notion of speed needs to be considered. The findings demonstrate that 
for some board members, the connectivity between management accounting 
information and organisational reality is not immediate. Where a board member is 
unable to make an immediate, or quick, connection with management accounting 
information – within the board meeting – this reduces the potential power of 
management accounting information to be used to frame discussion.  
When synthesised, these findings suggest a pervasive lack of desire for 
management accounting to frame general discussion within the board meeting. A 
practical implication of these findings is developed in the discussion that follows 
below. 
 
5.3 What does this intervention teach interventionist researchers and practitioners 
about using management accounting boundary objects within a board context? 
“Stories don't always have happy endings."  This stopped him. 
Stories [are] wild, wild animals and [go] off in directions you don’t expect.” 
Patrick Ness, A Monster Calls 
The “happy ending” to this story would be to report that the intervention brought 
about productive change through the (re)design of management accounting 
information. This is not the case. The management accounting boundary object was 
not adopted for use within the board meeting whilst the CEO remained in tenure. 
However, a reflection on the intervention as a whole highlights some key implications 
about the use of management accounting boundary objects at a board level. 
The intervention demonstrates that trying to change the design and presentation of  
management accounting measurements and metrics is not necessarily sufficient to 
bring about productive change within a board meeting. A sensitivity to the 
collaboration and control dynamic within the board itself is also required. For the 
board studied, management accounting information was embedded primarily within a 
control dynamic within the board meeting. The hold that control (Argyris,1990) had 
upon management accounting information appears to have stopped management 
accounting information from being used in a more dynamic, collaborative manner, 
both within the board meeting and within the intervention itself. Interventionist 
researchers and practitioners are minded to beware of the powerful control dynamic 
that exists within board level processes, and the impact that this might have upon the 
use of management accounting information.  
Noting this control dynamic, the notion of a boundary can be further refined. Prior to 
the intervention the boundary object was conceptualised as sitting on two key 
boundaries. It was conceptualised as sitting on the boundary between executive and 
non-executive collaboration. It was also conceptualised as mediating the boundary 
between the board meeting and organisation because of its potential to give a 
visibility of the organisation at a distance. The intervention teaches interventionist 
researchers and practitioners that the boundary object was also positioned on a third 
boundary: the boundary between collaboration and control - within the board meeting 
itself and the intervention process, too. The implication of this result is that it must 
not be naively assumed that collaboration amongst a board can be facilitated without 
an awareness of control issues – both inside and outside the board room. Simply 
calling some management accounting information a boundary object does not mean 
that it will be used in a collaborative manner. This result harmonises with Barrett and 
Oborn (2010) who observe how control can prevent collaborative working and 
knowledge sharing at an operational level.  
Developing the theme of facilitating collaborative working, an analysis of the 
intervention strategy adopted reveals weaknesses with the intervention design itself.  
Even though the research team were conversant with the more informal and 
dynamic styles of interventionist research (eg. Daniels et al. 2010) that are 
specifically designed to encourage collaborative working, an interview and report 
approach was adopted by the intervention. From a critically self-reflexive perspective 
(Humphrey, 2014; Dumay, 2010), this semi-formal and problem solving style felt 
radical, collaborative and a major departure from the usual style of board business 
for the lead researcher. Yet private interviews, combined with the publication of a 
carefully written report to the board, were unable to create collaborative change 
within the board studied. The work processes of the intervention were unable to 
facilitate productive change. As in Hough et al. (2015) this intervention gives another 
instructive empirical example of how difficult it can be to create collaborative activity 
around management accounting data within a board.  
It must be noted that at the beginning of the intervention more radical forms of 
intervention were considered. These were discounted because the lead researcher, 
as an insider, did not have the emotional resilience or theoretical sensitivity to 
advocate a more collaborative, less formal, style of intervention. For example, the 
project was badged as action research to fellow board members and this felt 
incredibly innovative. Where interventionist researchers and practitioners want to 
facilitate collaborative working within boards, centred upon management accounting 
information, this article commends the adoption of bold, creative interventions. Such 
interventions need to be designed to accentuate collaborative working between the 
executives and non-executive whilst reducing the negative aspects of control 
dynamics. It is hoped that the lived experience of the lead researcher, described 
here, gives courage to future researchers to achieve this. 
 
5.4 The implication of board level talk not being “operational” 
In the board studied, non-executives did not want to engage in operational type talk 
within the board meeting. For example, the chair stated that they wanted the board 
meeting discussion to progress “without going into all the details and without 
managing it as executives.” This reluctance to engage into the domain of the 
executives within the board meeting has been highlighted by Parker (2007) and 
Cornforth and Edwards (1999). However, the implications of this resistance to talk in 
an operational manner at the board meeting have not been fully elaborated in the 
literature. A key implication of not engaging in operational talk at the board meeting 
is now highlighted. 
As explained in the literature review, at the operational level, if management 
accounting is not discussed in an operational, problem solving manner – where 
people can “tack back-and-forth” (Star, 2010, pp. 605) between it and other 
understandings – management accounting information is unable to give a rich, 
expansive visibility of an organisation (Abrahamsson et al., 2016). This is because 
technical management accounting understandings need to be intertwined with 
operational understandings to create such a visibility (Abrahamsson et al., 2016, 
Laine et al., 2016). Thus, where a board is reluctant to engage in operational talk 
within the board meeting itself, management accounting information will never be 
able to give a rich and expansive visibility of the organisation through the board 
meeting alone. An intertwining of technical management accounting understandings 
and operational understandings will never occur. Ironically, the good governance 
practice of non-executives not encroaching upon executive matters, is also the 
practice that prevents non-executives from developing a meaningful visibility of the 
organisation using management accounting information within the board meeting. 
Hough et al. (2014) call for action research to investigate how learning cultures and 
board routines might be developed to stimulate board level discussion around 
management accounting information. Brennan et al. (2016) harmonise on this point 
stating that “[this problem] cannot be addressed with more information. Rather, 
better processes of information/knowledge exchanging, sharing and creation are 
required” (pp. 159). The challenge for interventionist researchers and practitioners is 
to understand what kind of social setting is required for non-executives to be able to 
interact with management accounting information in a way that allows them to gain 
the visibility of the organisation that they need. Such a setting would need to facilitate 
management accounting talk becoming a living language (Laine et al., 2016, Hall, 
2010), something that was not the case for the board studied. It would have to allow 
non-executives to talk to executives, and possibly managers and employees, in a 
way that fused operational understanding and management accounting data in a 
coherent manner (Abrahamson et al., 2016). It would also need to allow non-
executives to interact with management accounting information at a speed that they 
were comfortable with. However, even though it would be appropriate to make such 
an opportunity available to all non-executives, some might not want to engage in 
such a process.  
  
This article suggests that the most appropriate place for non-executives to be given 
the opportunity to engage with management accounting information, in a manner 
that provides a meaningful visibility of the organisation, is outside of the formal board 
meeting context.  This is because the type of talk, and collaborative activity, required 
to make the organisation visible to non-executives would need to be facilitated and 
encouraged in a manner that the formal board meeting does not tend to stimulate. It 
might be argued that the appropriate place for such interaction would be a sub-
committee. This might be the case, but where a control dynamic dominates a sub-
committee, it is unlikely that a sub-committee would be the most appropriate 
environment for this to take place. Accordingly, this article calls for research into the 
creation of ‘out of board meeting’ experiences for non-executives, to allow them to 
engage with management accounting information in a way that helps them gain the 
organisational visibility they require. What sets this call apart from things such as 
factory tours etc. is its attention to fusing management accounting information and 
operational talk, for non-executives. Emotionally (Samra-Fredericks, 2000; Brundin 
and Nordqvist, 2008) and socially (Huse, 2005) this would require the executives to 
understand why such an ‘out of board meeting’ experience was required. The 




6. Conclusion  
This article contributes to the literature that considers the intersection of corporate 
governance and management accounting information. It also develops the 
management accounting and boundary object literature, by locating its study of 
management accounting information at a board level and not an operational level.  
Additionally, it contributes rich empirical evidence to the qualitative non-profit 
governance literature (Parker and Hoque, 2015; McNulty et al., 2013) with its study 
of an English Further Education College. 
Empirically, the findings support Parker (2007) and Cornforth and Edward’s (1999) 
observation that non-executives do not want to engage in operational type talk within 
the board meeting. A significant implication of this observation has been developed 
theoretically. Management accounting information can only give an expansive 
visibility of an organisation if it is fused with operational understandings. This fusion, 
or intertwining, takes place within operational type, problem solving talk. If this type 
of talk is not present within a board meeting, non-executives will never gain the 
visibility of an organisation - that can be mediated using management accounting 
information - from the board meeting alone.  
By studying the mental models of board members a deeper understanding of 
directors’ attitudes and boardroom behaviour has been offered. It has been argued 
that within a boardroom, where understandings of management accounting 
information are not intertwined with operational understandings, management 
accounting information primarily renders executive control visible. Within such 
boardrooms, management accounting information does not provide the holistic 
mental model of an organisation around which board members prefer to frame 
discussion. This insight explains why board members may be reluctant to structure 
their boardroom discussion around management accounting information. Moreover, 
by studying directors’ mental models this article has begun to penetrate to the “very 
heart of director thinking and behaviour [within the boardroom]" (Parker, 2008, pp. 
86) 
These contributions explain why management accounting information might not 
always render an organisation visible, in an expansive manner, within a board 
meeting. They also expose potential limitations of using management accounting 
information in the boardroom. Recognising these limitations, the article has 
contributed some novel, yet unsubstantiated, suggestions to encourage the use of 
management accounting information at a board level.    
The methodology adopted has two key weaknesses. The findings are based upon a 
set of interviews (Smith and Elger, 2014) and the project was not a longitudinal case 
study (Archer, 2003). The fact that the lead researcher served on the board of the 
organisation for 8 years mitigates this weakness. Secondly, the extraction of mental 
models is a fallible enterprise (Hartwig, 2007). Mental models of complex 
organisations, and sophisticated processes like governance, take time to develop. 
Knowledge can become so embedded within a knower that it might not be directly 
observable using the methodology employed here. Further work is called for that 
uncovers how management accounting ideas are embedded, even if invisibly, within 
experienced board members over time.  
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